Proverbs as Integrative metaphors: Common classificatory principles for inter-cultural comparison of Proverbs and metaphors

Linnei Li and Bill Geddes

While categorization and classification processes underpinning linguistic expressions have a universal base because of common thought processes in human beings, it is the processes for the formal generation of these expressions which are similar across cultures, not the features of the generated expressions. The resulting constructs gain their particular form from the historically generated categorizational presumptions in each culture and so different cultures do exhibit different ways of perceiving and expressing metaphoric language because of a range of historically determined factors. In this article we suggest that what superficially appears similar might, in fact, be very different in the understandings of people in different cultural communities. The similarities are a consequence of common generative processes in all human beings. The differences are a consequence of the particular emphases and focuses in categorization which have emerged through time in different communities. Equally, communities might well express very similar ideas in very different ways. As a result, both metaphors and proverbs can:

a) have different forms but have similar meaning, e.g., To shed crocodile tears=mao ku laoshu( cat crying over mouse, indicating the universality of the perception of 'hypocrisy'. (It is in the sphere of universal emotions, human conditions that we can find many other examples of this kind);

b) have similar forms but very different meaning, e.g. proverbs relating to colours and animals, indicating that the association of ideas/feelings where colours are concerned is very much culture-bound, and our attitude towards animals/pets is deeply ingrained in different cultures.

Once, speaking with a person about the problems of an apartheid South Africa, he observed that, in the eyes of South African officials ‘Two blacks do not make a white’. In his observation he had invoked a proverb, which, in common with many proverbs, can, in Western 1 communities, be interpreted in a number of quite different ways. The term ‘black’ can stand as a metaphor for vice (black deeds etc), oppression (black moods) persons (black people: of Negro or similar origin), negation (as in (-1 + -1)≠+1) and so on. Similarly, the term white can be interpreted as an oppositional referent in each of those areas. That is, the proverb evokes and contrasts particular presumed relationships between color referents and referents in the categories of virtue, mood, ethnicity and even number. The comparison it conjures up is one of relationship between items within categories rather than a comparison of characteristics of descriptive elements between categories.

Whereas the proverb above invites the hearer to presume a similar relationship between the implied referents as in the stated ones (white and black as polar extremes (or ‘opposites’) in both color and people), metaphors, as in ‘the lady was spaghetti thin’, evoke a comparison between descriptive markers of elements in different categories - two kinds of thinness: thinness in human beings and thinness in forms of pasta. The proverb evokes a comparison between two kinds of relationships of items within categories: the relationship between the colors black and white and the relationship between vice and virtue; between depression and happiness; between negative and positive; between Africans and Western Europeans. That is, the proverb acts as an integrative metaphor, conjoining metaphors which evoke a comparison between characteristics of elements of different categories and focusing on the relationships evoked by the comparison of the elements of the metaphors.

Illustration 1: Proverb as integrating metaphor

In this article we suggest that, while both metaphor and proverb are language expressions, they are, more fundamentally, expressions of the most basic categorizational processes of the human mind. To use a metaphor, explaining proverbs and metaphors at the level of language without taking the categorizational processes which generate the linguistic forms into account is like examining the movement of a piston head in a combustion engine without taking the connection between it, the piston rod and the crank shaft into account.

The nature of metaphor

To understand the structure of proverbs, one must first understand the structure of metaphors. Metaphors are only secondarily a feature of language. Primarily, they are integral to the processes of categorization and classification which determine how human beings understand their worlds. As such, they underpin language and are reflected in the linguistic structures of communities. Linguistic phenomena such as metaphor and other expressions of analogy and similitude are formalised representations of more fundamental categorical and classificatory conceptualisations. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 6) suggest, ‘Metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely because there are metaphors in a person’s conceptual system’, or, as Lynne Cameron (1999, 11) 2 puts it,

the conceptual system is not only involved in the processing of metaphor, but … thought is itself structured metaphorically, and … the systematicity of metaphor on the surface of language merely reflects underlying conceptual structure in which something is understood, stored and processed in terms of something else.

The process of ordering reality is a process of categorization which proceeds through establishing degrees of identity between phenomena using structural scalar continua such as similarity, complementarity, displacement, containment, accompaniment (many of these continua are central to linguistic theory – e.g. see Hjelmslev 3 (1969)) and descriptive scalar continua such as length, height, breadth, colour, hardness. The characteristics of such identificational scales are, in their scalar detail, community specific. So, for instance, colour discrimination, based on the same set of physiological experiences across communities, nonetheless exhibits community specific variations. As Ian Davis (1998, 433) 4 describes of Heider’s (1972) 5 research,

She found that even though the Dani [of Highlands Papua New Guinea] had only two basic colour terms - mill 'dark' and mola 'light' - they remembered focal exemplars (the best examples) of eight English colour terms better than non-focal exemplars. Further, they learned names for the focal exemplars more effectively than for the non-focal exemplars. Heider interpreted her results as reflecting the universal perceptual distinctiveness of the focal exemplars, perhaps derived from universal perceptual physiology (De Valois & Jacobs, 1968 6 )… . Although the Dani remembered focal colours better than non-focal colours - consistent with universalism - their performance was much worse than the American comparison group, which could reflect the Dani's limited repertoire of basic colour terms.

Identificational scales are, themselves, divided into regions each of which encompasses a range of the scalar possibilities. For example, the identificational scale of ‘hardness’ might be divided into regions such as ‘soft’, ‘firm’, ‘hard’. These recognised regions, and the breadth of scale included in each, are community specific. So, as Davis (1998, 434) observes of Setswana recognised colour regions,

speakers of languages with less than 11 basic colour terms should have 'perceptual categories' corresponding to the missing universal categories. In a sense, there are nascent linguistic categories ready to form at physiologically determined 'faults' in colour space. Thus, for instance, if speakers of a language with no separate terms for GREEN or BLUE (such as Setswana, which we include here) were asked to sort colours in the GREEN - BLUE region into two groups based on their perceptual similarity, they should tend to sort them into one group focused around GREEN and one group focused around BLUE, just as speakers of languages such as English or Russian that do have separate GREEN and BLUE terms would do.

Of course, while Davis speaks of perceptual ‘categories’ and universal ‘categories’ in relation to colour discrimination, the terminology employed here is one of scales and scalar values 7 . Particular values from identificational scales are attached to elements of categories and, in their sum, these markers distinguish category elements from each other. The markers (or values) therefore, should not, themselves, be considered categorical constructs.

Identificational scales reflect the experiences and understandings of the community which perceives them and utilises them in defining categories and their contents. As individuals, and ultimately communities, elaborate the scales they use, the identificational markers attached to elements of categories must be adjusted to the newly refined scale in terms of which they are understood. At the individual level, this implies a process of re-evaluation: that is, a refinement of the definition of categories and their elements. At the community level, in the interests of conservation and stability, attempts at elaborating descriptive scales will be resisted or will be confined to those who need increased refinement of the scales for specific purposes. This is fundamental to the emergence of ‘specialisms’ in Western communities.

Sometimes, inevitably, this process leads to the adjustment and elaboration of communally accepted identificational scales. The communal and individual effects of elaborating definitional scales can be deeply disturbing since this requires re-evaluation and readjustment of current definitions and categorizations to fit the elaborated scales, calling current understandings into question and making those involved in the process feel that life is full of uncertainty, that nothing quite makes ‘sense’ any more. (This is well illustrated in Carl Jung’s 8 explanation of the nature of human unconscious category processing .)

Standardised metaphors and proverbs are some of the means by which human beings reaffirm long-standing definitions and relationships. They provide, to use Richard Honeck’s (1997 p.44ff) phraseology, ‘frozen’ linguistic forms which reiterate and reinforce long held comparative relationships between categorized phenomena. The proverb above is based upon a culturally particular understanding of the nature of the relationships which exist between particular values within descriptive scales. It not only compares items within categories, it also reasserts the correctness of presuming polar values as ‘opposites’ rather than as, for example, variations on a theme. The ways in which scalar continua are evoked differ between cultural communities. Western communities tend to evoke the poles of continua (or of demarcated regions of continua) as mutually exclusive values (opposites) and see intervening values in terms of deviation from the poles. This does imply equilibrium and balance and that requires the establishment of a mid point in the scale (the ‘middle’ or medium value) but the focus is on the poles rather than on the midpoint of the scale. This is a feature of the proverb which plays on variant understandings of the terms ‘black’ and ‘white’. Black and white are seen as polar opposites and evoke presumptions of similar opposition between the elements of the implied categorizational couplets of good and evil, right and wrong, Caucasian and Negro and so on.

Chinese communities tend to evoke the midpoints of continua or regions within continua and see radiating values in terms of deviation from the midpoint. The consequences of such differences can be profound. Western communities start by establishing poles for all continua (black and white; north and south; good and evil etc.), whereas the poles can be seen as relative to the midpoint and so only defined in terms of it in Chinese communities. To quote K'ung Chi 9 ,

While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of Equilibrium. When those feelings have been stirred, and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of Harmony. This Equilibrium is the great root from which grow all the human actings in the world, and this Harmony is the universal path which they all should pursue.

This, inevitably, results in less clearly defined extremes of continua than will be found in Western language. The comparative tropes of metaphor in Chinese thought will focus on the implication of difference between closely related categorical items rather than the implication of similarity between widely differentiated categorical items. This is well illustrated in many of the Sinological studies which suggest an absence of metaphor in Chinese poetics. As Ekstroem (2002, 255) says,

Sinology has traditionally provided three overlapping explanations for the supposed absence of metaphor. First, the spontaneity, and with it the absence of premeditation, in lyric inspiration simply preclude the construction of abstract tropes. Second, the origins of poetics in China have been sought in its early philosophy, and their linkage contrasts with that between Western poetics and its philosophical sources: “Figurative meaning cannot be conceived of independently from a certain worldview” (Jullien 2000 [1995]: 166). With remarkable synergy, the notion of correlative cosmology has come to define the fundamental difference between the Chinese and the Western systems of thought. Against the Occidental, Platonic division of the world into phenomena and ideas, Sinologists pose a cosmology whereby things of the same category (lei) constantly interact and exert influence on one another.

And so, where Western philosophy starts from a presumption of difference between phenomena and, presuming difference (which, in Western models of communal organization and human interaction, results in presumptions of human individual independence and autonomy), searches for shared characteristics (the process of metaphorization), Chinese thought presumes an underlying homogeny in phenomena and is preoccupied with differentiating that which superficially appears similar. As Ekstroem (2002, 259) says,

Indeed, the all-important Mencius (mid-fourth century B. C.) quotes Confucius himself as saying: “I detest that which [only] seems to be, but is not… I detest the bristlegrass, fearing that it will disorder… the young plants [which its leaves resemble]; I detest the lip server, fearing that he will disorder Righteousness; I detest the glib tongue, fearing it will disorder trust; I detest the [lascivious] tones of [the state of] Zheng, fearing that they will disorder [true] music…

These orientations in apprising definitional scalar values pervade all forms of categorization and classification within cognitive communities as Anne Tsui et al (1997, p. 59) explain, examining Western and Confucian Chinese understandings of the ‘self’,

… Chinese often view themselves interdependent with the surrounding social context, and it is the "self in relation to other" that becomes the focal individual experience. This view of an interdependent self is in sharp contrast to the Western view of an independent self. The latter sees each human being as an independent, self-contained, autonomous entity who (a) comprises a unique configuration of internal attributes (e.g., traits, abilities, motives, and values) and (b) behaves primarily as a consequence of these internal attributes (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). This divergent view of self has implications for a variety of basic psychological processes (e.g., cognition, emotion, and motivation) and may be one of the most fundamental differences between the East and the West in social relations.

Given these fundamental orientations in understanding the relationships existing between values within definitional scales, it becomes difficult to directly compare the operation of metaphors and proverbs within Chinese and Western communities. There are, however, a number of fundamental classificatory principles in terms of which such comparisons can be made. To understand these it is necessary to have a rudimentary grasp of the nature of categorization and classification in human thought.

Processes of categorization and scalar marking (definition)

The never-ending modification and refinement of reality within cosmological communities 10 is a process of continual refinement of categorization. This is accomplished through establishing sub-categories of elements included in higher level categories and comparing and contrasting the scalar values of identificational elements of both those categories and sub-categories and of items contained in them. The process must, logically, result in sets of inclusive categories containing pyramids of sub-categories which increasingly diverge from each other as categorization and classification is refined. As illustrated below, each element in the ‘original’ category of all phenomena is, in fact, a summation of all the sub-categories contained within it. Those sub-categories, however, are increasingly defined as separate from the sub-categories of other ‘1^st order’ elements (i.e., the elements of the original category). The process of progressive sub-categorization produces categorizational sets which are understood by those who order reality in terms of them as separate domains, each with its own rationale 11 . As Mary Douglas et al (1979 12 ) have suggested in relation to understanding food taboos, ‘food taboos are rooted in a cosmological conception rather than nutrition and taste’. In many communities the mixing of items belonging to different categorizational sets is seen as dangerous and those who confuse categories are considered aberrant.

So, as the process of sub-categorization proceeds, the thinker is left with the problem of how to ‘connect’ elements which exist within different categorizational sets. The answer is, of course, metaphor. To quote Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 3) 13 ‘… the way we think, what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of metaphor’. This has been understood for centuries in Chinese cosmological thought. As Martin Ekstroem (2002, 253) 14 puts it, ‘the theory of “correlative cosmology” – to use the conventional sinological term - … sought to reveal the hidden system of “categorical correspondences” (lei) according to which the seemingly disparate phenomena of the world were organized.’

Illustration 2: The development of Categorizational sets and included sub-category hierarchies

‘Thought’ is the process of evoking sets of established relationships between already categorized phenomena, with the ‘simplest’ thought being that which traces clearly established connections between phenomena within the same pyramidal hierarchy. Metaphors (of whatever variety) provide a means of connecting elements of otherwise unconnected or poorly connected categories (bringing together phenomena which belong in separate pyramidal hierarchies) without, in doing so, breaking the categorizational rules established to maintain the integrity of the categorizational system. In other words, metaphors are the ‘bridges’ (another metaphor) between pyramids of categories. As Raymond Gozzi 15 puts it, ‘A metaphor is commonly thought of as a bridge - a linguistic bridge linking two separate conceptual domains.’ (1997, 348)

The process of metaphorization is similar to that involved in categorization, that is, it is a process of establishing degrees of identity between phenomena in otherwise unconnected or poorly connected categories using scalar continua such as similarity, complementarity, displacement, containment, accompaniment and all the commonly recognised comparative descriptive scales – length, height, breadth, colour, hardness etc.. The scales which exist within each category are specific to the category. But each scale is a subset of the possibilities of a universal scale. For example, degrees of hardness for pillows is very different from degrees of hardness for steel, yet both sets of possibilities can readily be envisaged as degrees of hardness in a superset scale of hardness. The process of metaphorization is one which allows for pseudo comparison between placement on the subset scales of the two categories – a soft pillow of steel.

The characteristics of a metaphor are summed up in the relativities of the descriptive sub-scales of the connected categories. Particular expressions of the metaphor will, therefore, evoke sets of relationships between phenomena (and between the pyramidal hierarchies of categories within which they occur) which can be mapped along the continua of comparison which underlie all classification and categorization. Since the descriptive sub-scales invoked are specific to each of the linked categories, but each sub-scale is divided into regions based upon the regional divisions of the superset scale from which it is derived, it is possible to invoke a region of the sub-scales as though the regions being related are comparable – e.g. hard pillow and hard steel.

Illustration 3: Scales and internal Sub-scales

Mapped on the super-scale from which the sub-scales are derived, one will arrive at very different superset values for scalar values which are recognized as relatively similar when comparing the sub-scales. For instance, one can speak of a ‘soft’ pillow and of ‘soft’ steel. On the super-scale from which the sub-scales are derived, the scalar value of soft steel is very different from the scalar value of soft pillow. Invoking ‘pillow’ and ‘steel’ allows comparisons of degree of hardness which are entirely relative to the subscales of the categories being bridged.

The human subject constructs not only hierarchies of categories, but also hierarchies of linking metaphors ( ‘integrative metaphors’ of which proverbs are an example). This allows for potentially complex comparisons of relative sub-scale values as the number of bridged categories and their elements increases in an integrative metaphor.

Since the categories and their contents are historically determined and vary between communities, the metaphors which connect them must also be, similarly, culturally specific. Apparently similar metaphors will evoke very different perceived connections and dissonances in different communities.

Human thought involves the maintenance of ‘balance’. That is, there is an ‘equalizing tendency’ at work which, in the case of identificational scales, produces constant elaboration since, whenever a new possible value is recognized within a scale, all scalar positions are adjusted to ensure equality between them. Consider the two scales below. The first is an unbalanced or unequalized scale, the second is a balanced or equalized scale. Human beings have a natural tendency toward equalizing the unbalanced scale - moving the scale lines until they are equal and/or elaborating the scale until all the recognized possibilities can be included in an equalized version of the scale.

Illustration 4: The equalization of scale values

In metaphor construction, this natural inclination toward balance and equilibrium results in selection of comparative elements of the metaphor from similar hierarchical positions within category pyramids. Where the metaphor uses elements which are ‘out of balance’, one of the features of the metaphor is a challenge to the hearer to restore balance or to account for the imbalance.

As demonstrated in the illustration below, each linking metaphor shares the characteristics of both the bridged categories and the more specific attributes of the selected items within each of the categories. For example: If category 1 is ‘Food’ and item 3 is ‘spaghetti’; and category 2 is ‘creeping things’ and item 5 is ‘worms’; then Linking metaphor 1 will have the characteristics of creeping things, with a focus on worm like creatures and of food with particular focus on either pasta and the item spaghetti within that sub-category (which might, itself, be seen as a sub-category of types of spaghetti), or on spaghetti if no sub-category is perceived by the subject. The comparison implied in metaphor evokes the descriptive markers of each element in the comparison and this, in turn, evokes the sub-scales of the superset scales which are employed in defining each element, allowing for pseudo comparison of very different superset values.

The integrating metaphor will evoke all the possibilities of the linked categories and focused items in the linking metaphors which it bridges. The more complete the categorical system held by those who evoke or respond to the metaphor the greater the subtlety and possibilities perceived in the metaphor. The allusions perceived in a metaphor by a child will be fewer than those perceived by a mature adult. A mature adult might well have a category ‘worms’ in which is contained a range of different creatures with wormlike characteristics, whereas a child might only perceive ‘worms as an item in the category ‘creeping things’

When a person hears a metaphor which goes through several hierarchically connected sub-categories within one linked category but does not do the same in the other category, the person will feel that the metaphor needs adjusting or ‘correcting’ so that the number of sub-categories involved in both primary bridged categories will be as close as possible. This is why it is possible to hear metaphors as inappropriate or in need of refinement. For instance, in linking metaphor 1 a person who has refined their categorization of pasta and has a refined set of categories for worms might feel that a connection of ‘spaghetti’ with ‘worms’ is a little crude and might want to exclude some kinds of pasta and/or some kinds of worms from the metaphor. This would be done by specifying the particular type of spaghetti and the particular type of worm to which the metaphor applies: ‘tubular spaghetti is like Gippsland earth worms’. Alternatively, if the person has an elaborated category of pasta but not an elaborated category of worms, the use of a metaphor linking spaghetti with worms is likely to make the hearer aware of the need for a categorical elaboration of worms. That is, the metaphor is carrying an implied message about the need for category elaboration in the interests of equalization or balance.

Not only can we have linking metaphors which connect unconnected hierarchies of categories, we can also have hierarchies of integrative metaphors, as illustrated below, which connect linking metaphors. It is postulated that proverbs and similar constructs (cf Honeck 16 1997, Ch. 2 for discussion) are best understood as ‘frozen’ integrative metaphors.

Illustration 5: Metaphorical linking of categories and their elements

Categorization and classification are based on assigning particular scalar values to phenomena (e.g. it’s off white, warm, firm, long, round, thin and flexible). All descriptive values are, by definition, scalar, that is, they are particular values from scales of possibilities – degrees of whiteness; degrees of hotness; degrees of hardness; degrees of length; degrees of roundness etc.. Items contained within categories are classified (that is, defined) by particular scalar values which, in combination, distinguish them from other category items. And, the sub-scales employed within categories are specific to the categories within which they are employed.

Language is not nearly so precise as the scalar values assigned to items inside categories. This is why, when someone asks – how thin? The speaker is able to make comparisons based on relative thinness. That is, the scale employed in marking (or defining) an item in terms of thickness is detailed, but the language employed economizes on detail by assigning generalizations of thickness unless asked for greater specificity. And all sub-scales and their generalizations (soft, medium, hard; thin, middling, fat) are relative to the category within which they are employed (a thin piece of spaghetti and a thin person do not have similar dimensions).

Metaphors commonly play on similarities and differences in the scalar values assigned to bridged phenomena. Metaphors focus on perceived classificatory commonalities and contrasts of phenomena which belong in different categorical hierarchies. So, a metaphor might play on the assigned ‘thinness’ of two phenomena, in which the thinness is relative to the categories in which each of the phenomena are found – this is often employed in humor. ‘She wobbled around like a thin piece of semi-cooked spaghetti’. So, a cross cultural study of metaphor and higher level integrative forms such as proverb, should focus on the nature of the perceived internal characteristics of definitional sub-scales; on the nature of the bridging processes (e.g. do they assume similarity and so focus on contrast, or assume difference and so focus on commonalities?);, and on the nature of those persistent or ‘frozen’ forms which are inherently conservative, reasserting long-established comparative relationships and characteristics. That is, the study of metaphor is a study of a particular comparative process common to all processes of categorization and classification. Since all people, everywhere, categorize their worlds, the study of metaphor at this level of abstraction can, indeed, be universal. One must, however, always presume that the focuses employed in comparing scalar values; the ways in which scales are elaborated; and the ways in which sub-scales are distinguished and compared will be culturally specific.

End Notes

1 We will use the generic term ‘Western’ to refer to communities which have their hegemonic roots in Western European history

2 Cameron L., 1999, Operationalising ‘metaphor’ for applied linguistic research, in Cameron and Low (1999) pp. 3 - 28

Cameron L. and Low G. (eds) 1999, Researching and applying metaphor, Cambridge University press, Cambridge

3 Hjelmslev, Louis translated by Francis J. Whitfield, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961, 1969 (Rev. Ed.)

4 Ian R. L. Davies, A Study of Colour Grouping in Three Languages: A Test of the Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis, British Journal of Psychology, August 1998 V89 N3 P433

5 Heider, E. R. (1972). Universals in color naming and memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 93(1), 10-20

6 De Valois, R. L. & Jacobs, G. H. (1968). Primate color vision. Science, 162, 533-540

7 Color can be unravelled as a set of scales including hue, saturation, contrast, lightness, and red, green and blue color shifts. The ‘colors’ recognized by a community are, somewhat arbitrarily, terms identified with particular combinations of values from these scales.

8 C. Jung, (1991) The psychology of the unconscious / translated by Beatrice M. Hinkle ; with an introduction by William McGuire, Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press

9 The Doctrine of the Mean, Translated by James Legge, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1893

10 for an explanation of the emergence of Western understandings of ‘reality’ see Geddes B., 1995, Economy, environment, ideology and marginalisation, in Perry J and Hughes J (eds), 1995, Anthropology: Voices from the Margins, Deakin University Press, Geelong, pp. 61 - 128

11 In Western categorization the primary categorizations are usually referred to as ‘environments’ – the economic, political, natural, metaphysical, social etc.. See Geddes (1995) for further discussion.

12 Douglas Mary; Bolo Paule; Fischler Claude, 1979, Les Structures du Culinaire, Communications 31 145-170

13 Lakoff George and Johnson Mark, 1980, Metaphors we live by, Chicago University Press, Chicago

14 Martin Svensson Ekstroem, Illusion, Lie, and Metaphor: The Paradox of Divergence in Early Chinese Poetics, Poetics Today, Volume 23, 2002

15 Raymond Gozzi Jr., Metaphors by the Seashore, Etc.: A Review of General Semantics, Fall 1997 V54 N3 P348, 5

16 Honeck Richard P., 1997 A Proverb in Mind: The cognitive science of Proverbial wit and wisdom, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, New Jersey